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uestions regarding the nature of time abound in West-
ern philosophy.  By asking them, we seek to clarify our 
knowledge and intuitions about an important aspect of 
our conscious experience.  In this paper, I will critique 
Sydney Shoemaker‘s well-known argument for the objective and 
empirical nature of time in order to show that time is instead 
phenomenologically ideal, that is, that time is generated, and its 
reality constituted, by a certain mode of our conscious, subjective 
experience. 
 
I. The Problem of Time 
 
We often ask ―Does time exist?‖ or ―Is time real?‖  This 
question is certainly worth asking, but requires a fair bit of clari-
fication.  What do we mean by exist and real?  When we pose the 
question ―Does time exist?‖ what are we really asking?  Without 
clarification, the question can on its face seem absurd—of course 
time exists.  We use it to measure the movements of the celestial 
Q 
bodies; we depend on it to organize our days and get to places 
when we need to be there; we age and use it to keep track of that 
aging.  Furthermore, we all have the vivid subjective experience 
of time—of earlier and later, and of past, present, and future.  So 
it seems clear from this evidence that time does exist.  But a co-
herent question about the existence of time surely mustn‘t ignore 
all these instances, so we must take the question to be getting at 
something else.1  The question then must become ―Does time ex-
ist as something more than, and outside of, our subjective experi-
ence of it?‖  That is, are objects, events, and beings really in time; 
is temporality an objective, inherent property of reality?   
There have been numerous responses to this question in 
the history of philosophy, including many contemporary ones.  
In his famous essay ―The Unreality of Time,‖ J.M.E. McTaggart 
argues that time does not exist, indeed cannot exist as we, as 
Western thinkers, have often conceived it.  However, it is impor-
tant to note that McTaggart only argues for the conceptual inco-
herence of time—he is not claiming that our subjective experience 
of time does not exist, only that ―[w]henever we perceive any-
thing in time—which is the only way in which, in our present 
experience, we do perceive things—we are perceiving it more or 
less as it really is not.‖2  This is a rather explicitly Kantian view, it 
seems, supposing that time is a necessary aspect of our experi-
ence, but that it does not apply to things as they really are in 
themselves.  But it is important to recognize, as is obvious, that 
even if we take McTaggart to have proven the conceptual non-
existence of time (as I do), we continue to have temporally or-
dered experiences.  Despite the apparent logical dismissal of 
time, our subjective experience of it does not simply cease.3 The 
dynamics of this subjective experience, and what it tells us about 
the deeper nature of time, is what I will concern myself with in 
this paper. 
 
II. Change Without Time 
 
I will now consider Shoemaker‘s account of time.  In his 
paper ―Time Without Change,‖ Shoemaker argues for the con-
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cept of ―empty time,‖ claiming that the existence of ―changeless 
intervals‖ could be an empirically verifiable phenomenon.  This 
is an important instance where time is thought to be an objective 
phenomenon, and its ―reality‖ is taken to depend on its having 
some external manifestation beyond our minds or subjective ex-
perience.  
First, let us examine Shoemaker‘s thought experiment 
and his argument for the possibility of changeless intervals.  
Shoemaker asks us to imagine a world, quite different from our 
own, which is divided into three regions: A, B, and C. Inhabi-
tants of the world are able to pass between the regions and can 
observe much of what is occurring in a neighboring region.  
However, periodically there occurs a ―local freeze‖ in one of the 
regions, during which all processes and activity in that region 
cease entirely.  The inhabitants of the other, non-frozen regions 
are able to observe a frozen region as such, but they are unable to 
pass into it.  Shoemaker then asks us to imagine that the inhabi-
tants of the world discover through the use of clocks in the un-
frozen regions that the local freezes always last the same amount 
of time, namely one year.  Additionally, through further meas-
urement they discover that the freezes occur at regular inter-
vals—every third year in region A, every fourth year in region B, 
and every fifth year in region C.  And here we come to the crux 
of Shoemaker‘s argument: with these intervals in mind, the in-
habitants are able to induce that every sixtieth year there will oc-
cur a ―total freeze,‖ in which all three regions will simultaneously 
be frozen for a year.  And since the inhabitants of each region 
have observed freezes in the other regions, Shoemaker believes 
that they would have good reason to think that this total freeze 
does indeed occur. He admits that one could argue that, since no 
one would ever observe a total freeze, the freeze every sixtieth 
year is simply skipped and does not occur.  However, in an ap-
peal to Occam‘s Razor, Shoemaker prefers his simpler theory, 
which supposes the occurrence of a total freeze, to the more com-
plex explanation for the anomalous non-occurrence of a total 
freeze. Shoemaker then employs a modified theory of causality, 
―action at a temporal distance,‖ to explain how his total freezes 
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begin and end, arguing that the very passage of time itself could 
have causal efficacy.4   He thinks that these total freezes give us 
reason to believe in the existence of changeless intervals, and 
therefore in the empirical and objective nature of time. 
Whether the concept of changeless intervals has any em-
pirical content or is nonsensical depends largely on whether we 
conceptualize time as objective or subjective.  The very fact that 
Shoemaker thinks that changeless intervals can occur reveals that 
he considers time to be an objective phenomenon.  However, 
there is a problem with this conception.  Consider that time is 
measured through change: the ticking of the hands of a clock, the 
movement of the sun, the decay of an atomic element, even the 
flow of our own thoughts. Change makes time intelligible.  But 
then, how is time without change possible?  I argue that it isn‘t. 
Shoemaker‘s term ―changeless interval‖ refers to a discrete, meas-
urable period of time that has a specific beginning and end.  And 
yet, though the beginning of such an interval would have to be 
preceded by a change, Shoemaker gives the passage of time itself 
the power to effect change by ending the interval. Shoemaker 
here is conflating ―change‖ and ―passage of time‖; he is giving 
the ―passage of time‖ the causal efficacy of ―change.‖ In this 
way, the passage of time becomes change—time has not escaped 
change. The only reason it may seem otherwise in Shoemaker‘s 
account is that his world functions in a manner radically differ-
ent from our own.  So, without change, the concept of a discrete 
―changeless‖ interval becomes unintelligible, and therefore un-
verifiable. His three zones make it conveniently possible for un-
frozen inhabitants to verify a changeless interval occurring in 
another zone: there is still change to measure time outside the 
changeless zone.  But given that our world does not have zones, 
and therefore only the occurrence of a total freeze is conceivably 
possible for us, changeless intervals must be devoid of empirical 
content.  From this we can see that Shoemaker‘s argument tells 
us nothing about the nature of our own world or the concepts 
concerning it.   
Now, consider that we start with the other possible as-
sumption, namely that time is subjective, and non-empirical.  
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Consider Kant‘s characterization of time as an a priori ‗pure intui-
tion‘ of the mind, transcendentally prior to experience, allowing 
us to have that experience at all, and through it, to make sense of 
the world.5  I assert that this conception of time is more plausible 
than an objectivist view, since the only real knowledge or evi-
dence we can have about time is our own subjective, intuitive 
experience of it.  It is important to note that, on the subjectivist 
view, time has no objective manifestation.  Indeed, it does not 
follow from the propositions that change is objective, and that 
change is a reference point in the (subjective) measurement of 
time, that time too is objective. Were one to attribute objectivity to 
time on the basis of these premises, he or she would succumb to 
what Kant called the Transcendental Illusion: ―And this [the tran-
scendental illusion] leads us to regard the subjective necessity of 
a certain connection of our concepts for the benefit of the under-
standing as an objective necessity in the determination of things 
in themselves.‖6 Kant here is emphasizing that necessary forms 
of epistemology do not reflect necessary forms of ontology: just 
because X is necessarily understood as Y does not necessarily 
mean that X is Y. On this formulation, just because time is, 
through its empirical measurement, necessarily understood as ob-
jective does not necessarily mean that time is objective. So, under 
this conception, time would exist inside the mind of the con-
scious observer, not as a quality or property of the external 
world. If we subject this theory to Occam‘s Razor, as Shoemaker 
did with his theory concerning the total freeze, we find that it is 
preferable to an objectivist account, as it posits only one entity, 
subjective time, as opposed to two: objective time and our subjec-
tive experience of it.  So, we can see from this view that if change 
were to stop, time would cease as well, since the change in our 
mental states and our representations, i.e., the ―succession of ap-
pearances,‖7 is what the pure intuition of time is arranging and 
apprehending.8  With change gone and nothing to apprehend, 
the pure intuition of time would be empty, and our subjective 
experience of time would cease.  
But now let us consider a thought-experiment counter to 
Shoemaker‘s.  Imagine a world metaphysically no different from 
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our own, but a world in which every person has mastered the art 
of meditation.  These people have all been brought up in the art 
of contemplative practice, and are so adept at its use that they 
have the ability to completely stop the flow of their rational, 
thinking mental states.9  This can be achieved in many ways, 
such as by focusing on one‘s breathing, which would assist in the 
gradual emptying of one‘s mind.  So, let us imagine then that 
there is a global festival held on this world every year, during 
which all the inhabitants enter into a meditative state at the same 
time, lasting for an agreed-upon interval of change, measured by 
(the ticking of) a clock.  Once in this state, each individual is able 
to still the intentional functioning of his or her mind.  Each 
would then experience a pure, objectless consciousness.10   In this 
state, the pure intuition of time would cease to apprehend any 
successions, for there would be no objects, internal or external, to 
represent.  And with the cessation of the intuition‘s operation, 
the subjective experience of time would fade and eventually dis-
appear.11  With every inhabitant of this world in an objectless 
conscious state simultaneously, the intersubjective experience of 
temporality would vanish, and time would effectively stop.12  
And yet, outside the stilled minds of the populace, change would 
continue.  Rivers would continue to flow, clouds would form 
and disperse, plants would photosynthesize, and the hearts of 
the meditating inhabitants would continue to beat.  And yet all 
this would occur outside of time.  Change without time. 
But how is awareness, i.e., evidence, of an objectless con-
scious state possible without time or intentionality as a frame of 
reference? That is, how are the meditators to verify, upon reflec-
tion, that they did indeed experience an a-temporal state, during 
which change nevertheless continued? We may look to con-
sciousness considerations within the study of the philosophy of 
mind to address these questions.  In his book Mysticism, Mind, 
Consciousness, Robert K. C. Forman examines the nature of what 
he calls the pure consciousness event (PCE).13 He argues from his 
theory of knowledge-by-identity that such an objectless conscious 
state as the PCE is an instance of non-intentional experience.  
Knowledge-by-identity is formed when the subject knows some-
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thing by virtue of being it.14  When one is in contact with one‘s 
own consciousness, the subject is not distinct from the object: 
pure consciousness experiences itself—subject and object collapse 
in on one another.  As such, knowledge-by-identity is a reflexive 
or self-referential form of knowing.15  Forman underlines the sui 
generis nature of knowledge-by-identity: 
 
To assume that we know our own consciousness in the 
same way we know another person, an apple, or even 
facets of our own personality would be to commit the 
fallacy of the displaced object. Our familiarity with our 
own consciousness is so intimate, so without seams, that 
we have no way of teasing out its constituent parts. In 
knowing it we just have an immediate sense of it and of 
its continuity through what we know (intellectually) as 
past and present.16  This intimate acquaintance— what I 
have called ―knowledge-by-identity‖—should be distin-
guished in epistemological structure from all other 
knowledge.17  
 
As my thought-experiment shows, the mind‘s ability to alter its 
own conscious states would allow the meditating inhabitants to 
experience an objectless state of which they could be fully aware. 
The awareness that a consciousness has of itself is not temporally 
constructed; ―[r]ather, awareness per se simply ties past and pre-
sent together as one single continuous awareness. That is, being 
aware transcends time.‖18 The concept of time without change as 
presented by Shoemaker falls short in both its objective and sub-
jective interpretations, and his thought-experiment fails through 
incommensurability. Nevertheless, Shoemaker was correct in 
suggesting that time and change are not necessarily coextensive.  
Through a reexamination of the concepts of ―time‖ and 
―change,‖ and their relation to pure consciousness, it seems clear 
that what is possible is not time without change, but rather 
change without time.  
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III. Conclusion 
 
 I have endeavored to show that time is phenomenologi-
cally ideal.  From my examination of Shoemaker‘s argument, we 
can see that time is not a typical empirical concept, and that it is 
unintelligible without change. And through my thought-
experiment, it has been shown that change without time is possi-
ble, due to the nature of pure consciousness.  From this, it can be 
concluded that time is not an independently existing entity or 
feature of the external world, but rather a phenomenological arti-
fact arising from a particular mode of subjective experience. 
Time is a function of rational consciousness.  It may be argued, 
contra this line of reasoning, that time could still be an objective 
feature of the world, that when we alter our consciousness and 
cease the apprehension of successions, we are simply cutting 
ourselves off from observing the time inherent in the world (and 
that this is why our experience of time stops).  It may be replied 
that the fact that we continue to have an experience of time when 
we close our eyes means that time is not something inherent in 
the external world, and that the flow of our mental states consti-
tutes a succession that gives rise to subjective time.19  Further-
more, the observation that the subjective experience of time 
ceases altogether when we remove the succession of our mental 
states shows that time is not something inherent in the mental 
world, since we are always observing our own consciousness, 
though not always as a succession.  Rather, time emerges from a 
certain mode of experience, one where things are experienced in a 
certain way (as successions), and therefore as being a certain way, 
namely temporal.  And as such, in response to our orienting 
question, time arises from the form of one type of our subjective 
experience, and it does not exist as something more than or out-
side of it.  Time is not a thing to be experienced, but rather a way 
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Notes 
 
1. This may seem entirely obvious, but it is of prime importance 
in philosophy to clarify what it is we are discussing.  I do not 
doubt that much time and effort has been wasted in debate due 
to the failure to recognize this distinction. 
2. J.M.E. McTaggart, ―The Unreality of Time,‖ in The Philosophy of 
Time, eds. Robin Le Poidevin and Murray MacBeath, Oxford 
Readings in Philosophy (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 
1993), 34. 
3. This may suggest that we are at least not purely rational beings, 
and that experience is not subject to all the vagaries of reason. 
4. Sydney Shoemaker, ―Time Without Change,‖ in The Philosophy 
of Time, eds. Robin Le Poidevin and Murray MacBeath, Oxford 
Readings in Philosophy (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 
1993), 75-76. 
5. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. Marcus 
Weigelt (1781; London: Penguin Books, 2007), A 31 = B 46. 
6. Ibid., A 297 = B 353. 
7. Ibid., A 31 = B 46. 
8. I would like, here, to note that the pure intuition of time is im-
portantly prior to the experience of change and succession, and so 
does not arise from it, but rather makes it possible as such.  I do 
not claim that the pure intuition itself would cease to be alto-
gether; I only suggest that without the content supplied by the 
apprehension of change and succession, the pure intuition of 
time would be empty and our subjective intuitive experience of 
time would cease. 
9. This proposition is really not so unbelievable, certainly not as 
fantastical as Shoemaker‘s thought experiment.  Hundreds of 
millions of people have been making contemplative practice a 
foundational aspect of their worldview for millennia.  That the 
mind is capable of acts and states far different from the everyday 
discursive thinking mode is certain, and the expansion of this 
ability has been the basis for religious and mystical beliefs for 
longer than Western civilization has existed.  The naïve belief 
that the ―I‖ and consciousness ceases to be when rational 
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thought stops surely descends from outdated Cartesian rational-
ism.  Indeed, people far less proficient in meditation than Zen 
masters and Yogis are able to reach such a state. I myself have 
experienced it, if only for a few moments.  I have experienced 
meditation periods of half an hour that have seemed to pass in 
five minutes.  We can think of this, in Kantian terms, as the pure 
intuition of time breaking down in the absence of thoughts and 
objects to represent as successions. 
10. This opposes the well-known views of Brentano and Husserl, 
and the popular view in contemporary analytic philosophy of 
mind, that all conscious mental states are necessarily directed at 
an object (the intentional object). 
11. See n. 7. 
12. Let us imagine, for the sake of the thought-experiment, that 
there are no animals or any other sentient creatures on the planet 
for whose subjective experience of time we must account. 
13. Robert K. C. Forman, Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1999), 59.  Forman is retired 
Professor of Religion and Philosophy at Hunter College and 
founder of the peer-reviewed Journal of Consciousness Studies. 
14. Ibid. 
15. Ibid. 
16. Parentheses Forman‘s. 
17. Forman, 127. 
18. Ibid., 122. 
19. It is also important to consider the fact that there are medita-
tive states of altered consciousness in which the individual con-
tinues to move and observe the external world visually, but is so 
adept at controlling their mental state that they also have no sub-
jective experience of time. Those capable of such states are con-
siderably rare, but they likewise demonstrate that time cannot be 
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